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ARTICLES
TRY, TRY AGAIN: WILL CONGRESS EVER GET IT
RIGHT? A SUMMARY OF INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
LAWS PROTECTING CHILDREN AND POSSIBLE

SOLUTIONS
Susan Hanley Kosse *

"[Sipeechwithin the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced
completely in an attempt to shield childrenfrom it."1

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Internet was made up of more than 600 million
users worldwide.2 There are now more than 150 countries linked
by the Internet.3 Recent studies indicate in the United States in
2002, 89.5% of children from the ages five to seventeen use computers and 58.5% of them are using the Internet.4 This percent* Susan Hanley Kosse is an Associate Professor of Law at the Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law, University of Louisville; J.D., 1991, University of Louisville School of Law;
B.A., 1987, Miami University. The author would like to thank her colleague, Les Abramson, for his constant support and advice. Thanks also goes to Glenn Kosse for his editing
suggestions.
1. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
2. Nua, How Many Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-manyonline/index.
html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
3. Cyberspace, Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. Mich.
1999).
4. COMM. To STUDY TOOLS AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRAPHY AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO OTHER INAPPROPRIATE INTERNET CONTENT, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 119-20 (Dick Thornburgh
& Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) [hereinafter NRC Report], available at http://www.nap.edu/
books/0309082749/html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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age increases dramatically with preteens (75.6% of fourteen to
seventeen-year-olds and 65.4% of ten to thirteen-year-olds). 5 This
is an increase from 51.2% and 39.2%, respectively, in 1998.6
Benefits the Internet provides our children are obvious, yet it
has the potential to expose them to sexually explicit material. Unfortunately, sexually explicit or pornographic sites are on the
World Wide Web in greater and greater numbers.7 Although it
would be nearly impossible to determine accurately the number of
such sites, there is evidence that they are increasing.' According
to a recent law review article, in 1997 there were ten thousand
sites containing sexually explicit material on the Internet. 9 By
1999 this number had grown to between thirty and sixty thousand sites.10 More than 100,000 pornographic websites now exist
that can be accessed for free or without providing registration information. 1
The issue for many concerned parents is how to keep children
from accessing these inappropriate sites. Unfortunately, many
sites can be found inadvertently through what would seem harmless searches. For example, if a child types in "sleeping beauty" or
"girls.com," not only would they retrieve some appropriate material, but also sexually explicit material. 2 Girls.com "features
'125,000 [sic] hardcore pics' and 'Pam Anderson [and] Tommy Lee
uncensored videos.""' 3 A mistake of typing "whitehouse.com" instead of "whitehouse.gov" would lead children to a site containing
pornographic material and claiming to be the number one adult
website. 1'
And our children are seeing these websites. In a study conducted by the Crimes Against Children Research Center, 25% of

5. Id. at 120.
6. Id.
7. Heather L. Miller, Strike Two: An Analysis of the Child Online Protection Act's
ConstitutionalFailures,52 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 159-60 (1999).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id.
11. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
12. Miller, supra note 7, at 161.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 163.
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the children interviewed had at least one unwanted exposure to
sexual pictures during the year prior to the survey.15 Other studies have this figure much higher, especially as the age of the child
increases. 16 For example, one study showed 45% of those aged
fourteen to seventeen had seen such a site, compared with 15% of
those aged ten to thirteen.17
With this in mind, Congress has been attempting for the last
few years to pass legislation that will protect children from inappropriate and harmful material found on the Internet. i" Although
that goal is commendable, it has proven difficult to achieve without violating the First Amendment. 9 Activity in Congress and the
courts has been at a frantic pace on this issue. The pattern of
Congress passing legislation and then it being instantly challenged has been repeated over and over again during the past
seven years. This chart provides an overview of the legislation
passed on this issue since 1996.

15. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 132-33.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-26 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.); Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10821, 117 Stat. 650.
19. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002).
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27

Required commer- ACLU v.
cial web sites to col- Ashcroft33
lect a credit card
number or other
proof of age before
allowing Internet
users to view material deemed harm2
ful to minors

Remanded to
Third Circuit,
which ruled
COPA was
unconstitutional3

20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 231, 609 (2000).
21. Id. § 609.

22. Id. § 223(a)(1XB)(ii).
23. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
24. Id. at 849, 885.
25. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
27. Id. §§ 2252A, 2256(8)(B)(D).
28. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
29. Id. at 258.
30. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 231, 609 (2000).
31. Id. § 609.
32.

Id. § 223(a), (d), (e)(5)(B).

33. 535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
34. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399
(2003). Oral arguments were heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on March 2, 2004.
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Part Two of this article examines recent federal legislation, including the CDA and COPA, both of which tried to keep minors
from accessing harmful and inappropriate Internet material. 4
Part Three of the article examines CIPA with its filtering mandate.41 Part Four examines the laws addressing virtual child pornography, including the CPPA and the recently passed PROTECT
Act. Finally, Part Five of the article will be devoted to discussing
strategies to protect children, including non-legislative solutions.

II. RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Concerned about the volume of pornography and other inappropriate material available to any Internet user, including minors, Congress attempted to craft laws that would ban such ma-

47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G) (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000).
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000).
201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650-93 (2003).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502, 117 Stat. 650, 678-80 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31 (2000).
See id. § 254 (2000).
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terial.4 6 Both the CDA and COPA would have greatly reduced
material on the Internet that was harmful to minors, but they
proved to be too heavy of a burden on adult speech.47 Although
the statutes did serve the compelling government interest of protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors, certain provisions were not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest
or the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.4"
A. The Communications Decency Act ("CDA")
Passed as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
CDA prohibited Internet users from using the Internet to communicate material that was obscene or indecent to minors under
the age of eighteen.4 9 Specifically, § 223(a) provided:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,

46. See, e.g., id. § 231 (2000).
47. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 847 (1997) (finding that the CDA is unconstitutional); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that COPA is unconstitutional).
48. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874; ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 251.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
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shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.5 °

The second provision, § 223(d), prohibited the sending or displaying of messages that would be deemed, under contemporary
community standards, patently offensive to a person under eighteen years of age. It provided:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.5 1

These two provisions were limited by two affirmative defenses.
One protected individuals from liability if the person had taken
"in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances" to keep minors from the harmful material.12 The other covered individuals who restricted access by requiring certain forms of age proof such as a verified credit card or
5 3
an adult identification number.

50.

Id. § 223(a).

51.

Id. § 223(d).

52. Id. § 223(e)(5)(A).
53.

Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
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B. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Despite these limiting defenses, the Supreme Court struck
down the statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, violating the First Amendment.5 4 Since it
involved the First Amendment, the Court used a strict scrutiny
standard, which requires the government to show not only a compelling interest for the law, but also that the law is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to achieving the goal.5 5 In
striking down the CDA, the Court was troubled over undefined
key terms such as "indecent" and "patently offensive."5 6 The failure of Congress to define these, among other, words made the
statute unconstitutionally vague because an individual would not
have a clear understanding of what material was to be included
by those terms.5 7
Maybe even more troubling for the Court was the statute's
"wholly unprecedented" breadth since it was "not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities," but rather "[ilts openended prohibitions embrace[d] all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own
computers. . .,"" Although the statute would further the government's interest in protecting children from harmful Internet
material, the CDA would result in the suppression of legitimate
material that adults have a constitutional right to send and receive. 9 Because of this, the Court opined that the government
was required to use less restrictive means to achieve its goals of
protecting minors.6 0
Moreover, the statute was void of any guidance on which community standards in particular would be applied to determine
whether material was harmful to minors.61 Since the Internet is
available to the world, it is conceivable that a community standards criterion under this law could be interpreted to mean the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
See id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
See id.
Id. at 877.
See id. at 874.
See id.
See id. at 873.
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community that has the most restrictive views about what is offensive.62
Finally, the defenses provided in the statute were unworkable
and "[did] not constitute the sort of 'narrow tailoring' [necessary
to save] an... unconstitutional provision."63 Although the age
verification was a legitimate option for commercial sites, the
Court found that it was not economically feasible for noncommercial sites.' In addition, the Court was skeptical whether the current technology used by the commercial pornographers actually
kept children from gaining access.65 In light of the statute's
criminal sanctions, the Court agreed with the district court that
the government had failed to prove that the defense would reduce
the heavy burden on adult speech.6 6
This decision was hardly a surprise, even from a conservative
court. The inclusion of websites other than commercial websites
made the law fatally flawed from the beginning.6 7 In addition, the
vague terms used by Congress would make it impossible for any
ordinary person to know what was and was not prohibited.6" Although the intentions of the authors were good, the law could
never be seriously considered constitutional by the Court.
C. Child Online ProtectionAct ("COPA")
In 1998, Congress attempted to correct the problems with the
earlier CDA, and address the concerns raised by the Supreme
Court when it enacted COPA.6 9 Specifically, COPA prohibits an
individual or entity from: "knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by
means of the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 882.
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2000).
See id. § 223(a), (d).
Id. § 231 (1998).
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commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors.""
This second attempt was noticeably narrower than the CDA in
three respects. First, COPA only applied to commercial pornographers unlike the CDA, which affected all communications. 7 ' Second, COPA only applied to Web communications.7 2 Finally, the
standard was changed from the ambiguous, indecent, and patently offensive standard to a harmful to minors standard.7 3
Congress also defined some of the essential key terms including
"by means of the World Wide Web," "minor," "commercial purposes," and "engaged in the business."7 4 In addition, to clarify the
"harmful to minors" community standard criterion, Congress
adopted a slightly modified three prong test, set out first in Miller
7 5 which would give guidance in determining what is
v. California,
actually harmful to minors. For liability to attach, it must be
proven that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to
minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or sci76
entific value for minors.

D. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
The day after COPA became effective, the ACLU filed suit
claiming that the statute violated the First and Fifth Amend70. Id. § 231(a)(1).
71. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998).
73. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e).
75. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
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ments because it was vague and infringed upon the protected
speech of adults.7 7 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction preventing COPA's enforcement.7" The government appealed to the
Third Circuit, which affirmed the district court's order, holding
the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting the
injunction.79 Although the court did not rule on the statute's constitutionality per se, its opinion gave a clear indication that this
statute also would be found to be overbroad and thus unconstitutional.8 " Specifically, the court concluded its opinion by stating,
"[dlue to current technological limitations, COPA-Congress'
laudatory attempt to achieve its compelling objective of protecting
minors from harmful material on the World Wide Web-is more
likely than not to be found unconstitutional as overbroad on the
merits."8 '
1. The Third Circuit Review
To determine whether the preliminary injunction was properly
granted, the Third Circuit applied a four-prong test:
"(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably
harmed by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4)
whether
granting the preliminary relief will be in the public inter82
est"

The most important prong is whether there is a reasonable
probability that the party seeking the injunction will succeed on
the merits if the case is taken to trial.8 In analyzing this prong,

77. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd by 217 F.3d 162 (3d
Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d
240 (3d Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 498-99.
79. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. ACLU v. Ashcroft,
535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
80. Id. at 180.
81. Id. at 181.
82. Id. at 172 (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.
1999)).
83. Id. at 173.
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the Third Circuit recognized that the government did have a
compelling interest in protecting children from harmful material. 4 This objective, however, must be met in the least restrictive
means available.8" In surmising that the statute was unconstitutional, the Third Circuit focused on COPA's definition of "harmful
to minors" applying a "contemporary community standards"
clause. 6 It did so while recognizing that the district court had
identified several other grounds for declaring the statute unconstitutional.8 ' For example, the district court found that the economic costs and burdens of the age verification requirement were
too great of a burden on publishers, forcing them to stop publishing or more heavily censor what they published.88 The Third Circuit acknowledged that this may be true but opined that the even
greater problem with the statute was that the Supreme Court's
concern regarding the "community standards" test in the unconstitutional CDA was still not adequately remedied by this new
89
statute.
In response, the government argued that Congress had effectively dealt with this issue by including the Miller three-prong
test within the statute's text.90 The Third Circuit, however, was
not persuaded that this cured the problem since the facts in
Miller differed drastically from the current situation.9 ' Miller involved the mailing of sexually explicit material that was in violation of California law.9 2 The publisher of the information could
control to which geographic locations the material was sent. But
because the Internet has no geographic boundaries and publishers have no means of even knowing to what locale their material
goes, the Third Circuit reasoned that a community standards test
would be particularly troublesome and not appropriate.9 3 In essence, the publisher would be forced to censor material that may

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 174 n.19.
88. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999), vacated by 535 U.S. 564,
remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 399 (2003).
89. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 174.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 174-75.
92. See id. at 175.
93. See id.
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be accessed from extremely puritan communities or implement
costly age verification systems.9 4 This would effectively block material from all minors, even if it was not deemed harmful in their
own communities.9 5 In addition, adults would be unconstitutionally deprived of their rights.9 6
2. The Supreme Court Weighs In
The government appealed the Third Circuit's decision; the Supreme Court heard the case on November 28, 2001. 9' The Court
vacated the Third Circuit's opinion and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 9 The Court's plurality decision only addressed the narrow issue of whether COPA's use of the "community standards" criteria to define what is "harmful to a minor"
made the Act unconstitutional by violating the First Amendment. 99 In response to that question, the Court held that "COPA's
reliance on community standards to identify 'material that is
harmful to minors' does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment."'
The
Court did not address, however, whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague or able to survive the strict scrutiny standard. 10 1
In deciding that the use of "community standards" to identify
material that is harmful to minors did not necessarily violate the
First Amendment, Justice Thomas concluded that "community
standards need not be defined by reference to a precise geographic area." 2 Instead jurors could utilize the standards from
whatever community they were familiar with and not be limited
to the standards of the "most puritan" community.0 3 Although
the Supreme Court had previously been troubled by the CDA's

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
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use of community standards, this was not the case with COPA
because the "prurient interest" and "serious value" prongs not
found in the CDA narrowed the statute's coverage."°4 Agreeing
with Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor noted that the respondents failed to give examples of materials that would differ dramatically between communities given the other two prongs of the
10 5
test.
Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer argued that the legislative history illustrated that Congress meant "'community' to refer
to the Nation's adult community taken as a whole, not to geographically separate local areas."" 6 This reading would avoid altogether the problem of "the most puritan of communities with a
heckler's Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation."' 7
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, likewise supported the remand, but only because they were
unsure that the statute was "narrow enough to render the national variation in community standards unproblematic." 08 Noting that the Internet differs dramatically from regular mail or
telephones, the Justices were concerned that variations in community standards could be a particular burden for the Internet. 0 9
A decision whether this violated the First Amendment could not
be made, in their opinion, until the Third Circuit completed a
comprehensive analysis of the statute's coverage."'
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, voted to affirm the judgment of the Third Circuit, despite the fact that COPA was better
than the CDA because it persisted in using the community standards criteria,"' which he argued will impose the most conservative communities' viewpoints on the 176.5 million Americans that

104. Id. at 578-80.
105. Id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Despite this conclusion Justice O'Connor envisioned a time when overbreadth based on varying standards may exist and urged the
adoption of a national standard for obscenity to regulate the Internet. Id. at 587
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have Internet access.1 12 As a result, certain parts of the nation
will be denied access to material that would be acceptable to
them." 3 Justice Stevens did not believe that a certain community
had a right to "rid[14I not only itself, but the entire Internet, of the
offending speech."
3. Back to the Third Circuit
On remand, the Third Circuit held COPA unconstitutional because it failed the strict scrutiny test and was overbroad." 5 Although the court held the statute did serve the "compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors, ' certain provisions were not narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest or the least restrictive means of advancing
that interest. 17 Specifically, the court held that the statute's definitions of prohibited harmful material, protected minors, and
regulated commercial publishers all failed to be narrowly tailored. 18
The "material harmful to minors" was particularly troubling to
the court because the plain meaning of the text required evaluation of a single image or "exhibit on the Internet in isolation,
rather than in context."'19 Doing so would endanger a large range
of material that otherwise would be protected because a single
image taken out of context may be classified as harmful to minors
even though it would not be when considering the work as a
whole. 2 ° In addition, the word "minor" could refer to anyone under eighteen, whether that person is a three-year-old or a seventeen-year-old.' 2 ' What may have "'serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"' is different depending on the age of the
112. Id. at 606 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003).
116. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 628, 639-640 (1968)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 253. The "harmful material' definition describes such material as 'any communication, picture, image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind'
that satisfies the three prongs of the 'material harmful to minors' test: prurient interest,
patently offensive, and serious value." Id. at 252 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id. at 254.
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minor."' Likewise, certain images such as a "post-pubescent female breast" would not necessarily appeal to a young child's prurient interests.'2 3 As a result, web publishers would have insufficient guidance on what may or may not be acceptable to post on
their sites since they would not know to which specific age the
"minor" language applies.' 24 Although the government tried to argue the term "minors" should be interpreted as "normal, older
adolescents," the court refused to rewrite the plain language Con25
gress had provided.
Similar problems existed with the phrase "communication 'for
' 2' 6 The phrase
commercial purposes.""
was not limited to commercial pornographers, but instead included publishers who "have
posted any material that is 'harmful to minors' on their web sites,
even if they do not make a profit from such material itself or do
not post such material as the principal part of their business."127
Because this could potentially include non-commercial websites
that sell advertising space or publishers that have relatively
small amounts of harmful material on their sites, the court held
Congress must more narrowly define the phrase.'2 8
Finally, COPA's affirmative defenses would not save the statute because they actually would have the effect of unduly burdening adult speech. 29 The use of credit cards or verification screens
would deter users from accessing these sites and thus affect the
economic ability of the publishers to supply such communications. 3 ° Because of this economic reality, some web publishers
may begin to self-censor and not offer communications that would
be deemed harmful to a minor yet would constitute legitimate
adult speech.' 3 ' The Third Circuit found the chilling effects of giving identifying information to access the sites was an entirely different burden than any technical difficulties a user may face due

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 253-54 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(C)).
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)).
Id.
Id. at 256-57.
See id. at 260.
Id. at 258 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
Id.
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to slow response times or broken links.13 2 Additionally, the affirmative defenses did not provide publishers any assurances
against prosecution
since the defense only applied after prosecu133
tion had begun.
In addition to failing the narrowly tailored prong of the strict
scrutiny test, COPA also failed to satisfy the least restrictive
means prong. 34 The court noted that children could still get access to harmful material from non-commercial sites and foreign
websites.135 Minors could also obtain credit cards and view the
material.'3 6 Finally, less restrictive alternatives-filters, blocking
programs, and parental supervision-to achieve the government's
goals existed. 3 v
The court had similar concerns as to the breadth of the statute,
concluding that the terms "material harmful to minors," "minor,"
"commercial purposes," and "community standards" were all significantly overinclusive, sweeping in speech clearly protected for
adults. 3 ' The court refused to adopt a narrowing construction
that would make the statute constitutional, saying that "[a]ny attempt to resuscitate this statute would constitute a 'serious invasion of the legislative domain.""3 9
The Third Circuit's decision is the correct one. As unfortunate
as it is, courts should not uphold laws, even if drafted for a laudable purpose, that violate the Constitution.140 Although COPA is
significantly better than the CDA, it needs to be even more finetuned. The broadness of the terms "material harmful to minors"
and "commercial purposes" makes them capable of being used as
a ploy to ban controversial speech on subjects such as homosexu-

132. Id. at 259.
133. Id. at 260.
134. Id. at 261.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 261-65.
138. Id. at 267-70.
139. Id. at 271 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 479 n.26 (1995)).
140. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989);
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1999), vacated by 535 U.S. 564, remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003).
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ality and abortion.1 4 1 The definition of "minor" is also extremely
bothersome because there is no differentiation for different aged
children. 4 2 A one-size-fits-all approach cannot be adopted to this
complex problem. If Congress meant older teenagers, then they
should have specifically indicated this. As written, COPA continues to be too vague to accomplish its commendable purpose
without wreaking havoc with the First Amendment.
III. THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT ("CIPA") AND
ITS FILTERING MANDATE

Besides trying to remove the objectionable material altogether
or make it available to adults only, Congress tried to block it by
passing the Children's Internet Protection Act.'" This law required all libraries and schools receiving Internet subsidies to install filters. 4 ' The ACLU and the American Library Association,
among others, immediately filed a suit claiming the new law violated the First Amendment.'46 CIPA did not suffer the same fate
as the CDA and COPA and was ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court on June 23, 2003.'
A. FilteringBlocking-Software Bills CIPA
An alternative way to limit minors' access to harmful Internet
material is to use filtering software. Filtering software falls into
two general categories: predetermined blocking filters and ratingbased filters." The predetermined filters block speech by one of
five methods: "blacklists," "allow lists," "word-blocking," "image141. See Geraldine P. Rosales, Mainstream Loudoun and the Future of Internet Filtering for America's PublicLibraries, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 376 (2000).
142. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 253-55 (discussing COPA's broad definition of
"minor").
143. See id. at 254.
144. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 and scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)-(6) (2000).
146. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123
S.Ct. 2297 (2003).

147.

United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).

148. Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries:Internet Filtering Software vs. The FirstAmendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509, 513 (2000).
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blocking," or the blocking of entire categories. 149 Most common is
the use of blacklists, which block sites that have been predetermined to be inappropriate.' A recent report testing one software
blocking product found that "thousands of unbanned porn sites"
were not properly blocked, mainly because it was too difficult for
any manufacturer to keep up with all the new material added
daily to the Internet.' 5 ' In addition, many of the programs use
some form of word-blocking that often leads to the overinclusive
blocking of constitutionally protected material. 5 2 For example,
certain programs banned the word "breast,"153unintentionally
blocking all websites dealing with breast cancer.
Critics of filtering software argue that this technology can be
underinclusive as well. 5 4 Rating-based filters (PICS) are more
sophisticated, allowing individuals, webmasters, or third party
groups to rate sites by creating descriptive labels.' The PICS filters "read the labels and use their own filtering criteria to decide
whether to block the site." 5 ' The design of the technology makes
it much easier to individually tailor what will and will not be
blocked based on the policies and concerns of the library or school
using the filter.'57 Ideally, each community library could create
their own criteria for blocking sites. Realistically, however, this
can be too burdensome for the libraries, forcing them to adopt criteria designed by third-party organizations. 15 This, the critics argue, will result in these third-party organizations' subjective
value judgments being implemented by the libraries."'
Despite the debate over the technology, legislation requiring
schools and libraries with Internet access to install blocking software on their computers has been on the legislative agenda for
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 515-16 (quoting The Censorware Project, Passing Porn, Banning the Bible:
NZHZ's Bess in Public Schools, at http://censorware.net/reports/bess (last visited Mar. 30,
2004)).
152. Id. at 514.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 515.
155. Id. at 517.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 518.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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several years. The first proposed act to address the issue was the
Internet School Filtering Act.16 ° Senator John S. McCain (R-Az.)
introduced the bill to the Senate on February 9, 1998,161 while
Representative Bob Franks (R-N.J.) introduced House Bill 3177
on February 11, 1998.162 Both bills proposed amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 to require elementary and secondary schools and libraries
receiving federal Internet access subsidies to install blocking
software." Specifically, the legislation provided that "[n]o services may be provided.., to any elementary or secondary school,
or any library, unless it provides the certification... that it
has... selected a system for computers with Internet access to
filter or block matter deemed to be inappropriate for minors."16 4
The Senate version of the bill was referred to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and hearings were
held. 16 5 On June 25, 1998 Senator McCain reported to the Senate,
and the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. 166 The
bill was attached to the 1999 Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and related agencies Appropriations Act on July 21,
1998, and passed by the Senate on July 23, 1998.167 House Bill
3177 was referred to the House Commerce Committee, 168 but was
not acted upon.
Not to be discouraged, in January 1999, Senators John S.
McCain and Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings tried again. This time they
introduced the Children's Internet Protection Act.16 9 This bill was
then reintroduced by McCain as Amendment 3610 to the Labor,
Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill (House Bill

160. S. 1619, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998).
161. See 144 CONG. REC. 1054 (1998).
162. See id. at 1280.
163. See id. at 1055.
164. Id.
165. See S. REP. No. 105-226, at 7-8 (1998).
166. See S. REP. NO. 105-226 (1998).
167. The Internet School Filtering Act was attached to the Appropriations Act as
Amendment 3228. See 144 CONG. REC. 58610, S8614 (daily ed. July 21, 1998). The Appropriations Act, as amended, was approved by the Senate. See 144 CONG. REC. 58880 (daily
ed. July 23, 1998).
168. See 144 CONG. REC. 1280 (1998).
169. See 145 CONG. REC. S340 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999).
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4577)17 This amendment was approved by a vote of 95-3 on June
29, 2000.171
The House passed a similar, but not identical, bill on June 8,
2000. The legislation was referred to a conference committee to
reconcile the House and Senate versions. 1 72 The reconciled version
became an amendment to the Department of Health and Human
Services Appropriations Bill, which was passed by Congress on
Friday, December 15, 2000,17' and was signed by President Clinton on December 21, 2000.174
The
groups
entries
elected

American Library Association (ALA) and free speech
fiercely opposed the bill. The ALA website had multiple
urging its members to lodge their disapproval with their
representatives. The ALA advised their members that:

[F]ederal filtering mandates are not the answer to [the] very complex
question [of objectionable Internet material] because:
"

Federal filtering mandates are unfunded mandates. They
will require [the local] library to take on the onerous burden
of paying to install and maintain filters or be stripped of key
federal funding.

"

Federal mandates trample on the decision making responsibilities and capabilities of [the] local library board. Mandates do not allow [local library boards] to articulate...
community [-specific] values because they force [local library
boards] to turn over ... community decisions to corporate
entities.

*

Federal filtering mandates are a one-size-fits-all, overly
broad solution to a complex and local problem. Around 95%
of public libraries already have in place a formal policy to
regulate use of the Internet. But the Labor-HHS-Ed

170. See 146 CONG. REC. S5707-09 (daily ed. June 22, 2000).
171. See 146 CONG. REC. S5869 (daily ed. June 27, 2000).
172. See 146 CONG. REC. H6561 (daily ed. July 19, 2000). For the conference report on
the bill, see 146 CONG. REC. H12100 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000).
173. See 146 CONG. REC. S11885 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) for the Senate's agreement to
the conference report and 146 CONG. REc. H12502 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) for the House
of Representatives' agreement to the report.
174. See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335
(2000) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C. § 254 and scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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amendments prescribe broad, unfunded federal government
control in [the local] library.
Federal mandates will have the most profound effect on
those libraries which most need E-rate discounts and other
funding. Low-income, poverty-stricken libraries will not
have the resources to implement
filtering and comply with
175
the certification requirement.

The New York Times published an editorial urging Congress
not to pass the amendment. 1 76 The writer called federally mandated filters "absurd" and most likely "unconstitutional. " 17 7 Because filtering software is oftentimes ineffective, the author urged
78
that monitoring students more closely was a better solution.
In contrast, parent groups praised Senator McCain's relentless
efforts to protect children from the negative aspects of the Internet. The American Family Association strongly supported the
Bill, stating it would "provide a very effective solution to the
growing problem of pornography accessible on the Internet by
computers in schools and public libraries.
Before the bill was even signed into law, the ACLU announced
its plans to sue.' Chris Hansen, a lawyer for the ACLU, called
the filtering requirement "a mandated censorship system by the
federal government."' 8 ' Mr. Hansen took particular offense over
the bill's supporters' view that even though filters have multiple
problems, filters still were better than having nothing at all. Hansen stated that "It]he First Amendment doesn't have a 'good
enough' requirement ....
Suppose we said it would be better
than nothing for someone to go into Barnes and Noble and burn

175.

AM. LIBRARY

ASS'N,

FEDERAL

FILTERING

MANDATES,

at

http://www.ala.org/

cfapps/archive.cfm?path=washoff/filteringmandate.html (last visited Mar 30, 2004).
176. A Misguided PornographyBill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at WK 14.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Senate Approves Amendment Requiring Filters for Web Surfing in Libraries,
Schools, 69 U.S.L.W. 2028 (July 11, 2000).
180. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises Legal Challenge
as Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries (Dec. 18, 2000), available
at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=8219&c=252.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2004).
181. D. Ian Hopper, Associated Press, ACLU Fighting Internet Filtering (Dec. 19,
2000), available at http://www.apfn.net/messageboard/12-27-00/mbs.cgi.3560.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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every tenth book.
That sort of casual insensitivity to censorship is
1 82
disturbing."
B. PriorLawsuits over FilteringLaws
A lawsuit over the constitutionality of filters is nothing new. In
fact, lawsuits have been filed testing the First Amendment's limitations on the use of Internet filtering in public libraries. In 1997,
ten individual plaintiffs, all adult patrons of their local library,
brought suit to enjoin the library from installing filtering software on the library's computers.1 3 Earlier that year the library
board had voted to adopt a policy on Internet sexual harassment. 1" The policy required that .'[s]ite-blocking software... be
installed on all [library] computers' so as to: 'a. block child pornography and obscene material (hard core pornography)'; and 'b.
block material deemed Harmful to Juveniles under applicable
1 85
Virginia statutes and legal precedents (soft core pornography).'
The commercial product "X-Stop" was
chosen to limit access to
86
sites that violated the library policy.
The plaintiffs alleged a violation of their freedom of speech.8 7
Specifically, they argued that the policy impermissibly blocked
their access to protected speech and chilled their receipt of constitutionally protected materials.'
For instance, they could no
longer gain access to the Quaker homepage, the Zero Population
Growth website, and the site for the American Association of University Women-Maryland because these sites had been
blocked."8 9 Moreover, they claimed there were no clear criteria for
determining which sites would be blocked. 9 °

182. Id.
183. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d 783
(E.D. Va. 1998).
184. Id. at 787.
185. Id. (quoting the Library Board's Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:721

Since the libraries at issue were determined to be limited public forums, any content-based restriction had to be "'narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest."""' The court accepted the defendant's assertion that protecting minors from
harmful Internet material and avoiding a sexually hostile environment were compelling government objectives.' 92 But because
the filtering policy was too broad-it was not limited to minors
and there were not adequate standards for restricting speechthe policy was not the least restrictive means or reasonably necessary to achieve the government's goals. 93 The court noted that
less restrictive options were available, including library staff
monitoring, filters for minors only, and privacy screens. 194
Just the threat of lawsuits has made some libraries change
their plans to install filters.19 For example, on August 16, 2000,
the Nashua Public Library Board of Trustees in Nashua, New
Hampshire, voted to reverse their decision to install Surfwatch
software on all their computers.' 96 This reversal came after local
citizens opposed to the policy contacted the People for the American Way Foundation and some New England attorneys. 9 Likewise, the public libraries of Kern County, California changed
on their computers when the
their policy of requiring filters
98
ACLU threatened legal action.

Conversely, there has also been unsuccessful litigation for a library's failure to restrict children's access to harmful Internet
material. It is not surprising that many libraries choose not to
utilize filters, considering the American Library Association's position that any efforts to block access violate the Library Bill of

191. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun II), 24 F. Supp. 2d 552,
562 (E.D. Va. 1998) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983)).
192. Id. at 565.
193. See id. at 567-68 (analyzing the constitutionality of the library's Internet restriction policy).
194. Id. at 567.
195. B.A. Robinson, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, A Sampling of Internet Censorship Activities in Various Locations, at http//www.religioustolerance.orgcyber
pat2.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Rights. 199 Perhaps the most publicized suit filed concerning this
matter was Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore. °° In this case, a
mother filed suit hoping to force her local library to install filters.20 ' The impetus for the legal battle came after her 12-year-old
son downloaded pornographic pictures off the library's computer.2 °2 The case was dismissed in January 1999 in a onesentence ruling.2 °3
This issue has not been limited to just public libraries. In Palm
Beach, Florida in 1998, a mother sued the Broward County
School Board for, among other things, failing to install filters on
public school computers. 2 4 The case was settled on December 16,
1998.205
C. The CIPA Challenge-AmericanLibrary Association v. United
States
True to their promise, the American Library Association and
the ACLU, along with library patrons and website publishers,
filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of CIPA on March
20, 2001, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 20 6 On May 31, 2002, the three-judge court

199. Karen G. Schneider, Public Library Ass'n, Plain Facts About Internet Filtering
Software, Tech. Notes, at http://www.ala.orglala/pla/plapubs/technotes/internetfiltering.
htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
200. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, No. V-015266-4 (Cal. App. Pep't Super. Ct.
1998). As no opinion was written at the Superior Court level, see Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore, TECH. L.J. at http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/Kathleenr/Default.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004), for a summary of the trial court proceedings.
201. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
202. Id. at 775.
203. See Judge Dismisses Livermore Library FilteringSuite, TECH. L.J., at http://www.
techlawjournal.com/censor/19990115.htm (Jan. 15, 1999). Judge George Hernandez dismissed the suit, writing "[tihe Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief is sustained and the First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief is dismissed without leave to amend." Id.
204. Hoffman v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, No. 98-6290-CIV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla.
1999); see Second Amended Complaint at para. 28, Hoffman (No. 98-6290-C1V-HURLEY),
available at http://www.gocin.com/ramp/brwschool/lawsuit2.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2004).
205. Settlement Agreement, Hoffman (No. 98-6290-CIV-HURLEY), available at http://
www.gocin.com/ramp/brwschool/settlement.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
206. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123
S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
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unanimously found for the plaintiffs. °7 The court relied heavily
on an extensive factual record that established filtering products
were not effective because of their underinclusive and/or overinclusive nature which blocks constitutionally protected speech.20 8
As a result, the court concluded the mandatory use of filters was
not narrowly tailored to further the government's interest and
less restrictive alternatives existed.20 9 The government's argument that the unblocking features of the programs cured any defects did not persuade the court because having to ask a librarian
to unblock a site would have a chilling effect on patrons' speech.210
The court acknowledged several reasons why filters are ineffective at keeping harmful material away from minors.21 1 First, "no
category definition used by filtering software companies is identical to CIPA's definitions of visual depictions that are obscene,
child pornography, or harmful to minors."212 Automated classification systems thus are subject to overblocking and underblocking.213 In addition, these systems can only search text, not images.2" 4 Even if human review is possible, the approximately 1.5
million pages added to the Web each day make it impossible for
companies to realistically and accurately categorize pages because of limited staff and human error and misjudgment.2" The
addition of new pages to a website after it has been originally
categorized only exacerbates the problem.2" 6
Considering these limitations with filters, the court suggested
the existence of less restrictive methods for accomplishing the
government's goals.21 7 For example, libraries could adopt Internet
use policies and punish violators.2 18 In addition, the libraries
could use a "tap-on-the-shoulder" method to discourage minors
207. Id. at 495-96.
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id. at 410.
210. Id. at 486-87.
211. Id. at 429.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 430-31. The court spent a major portion of its opinion giving examples of
erroneously blocked websites. Id. at 446-47.
214. Id. at 431.
215. Id. at 433.
216. See id. at 435.
217. Id. at 480-84.
218. Id. at 480.
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from viewing harmful content.2 19 Privacy screens and terminals
outside of patrons' sight lines also are less restrictive methods as
compared to filters.22 °
Finally, the court held that CIPA's disabling provisions failed
to cure the defects.2 21 The court surmised that patrons would be
reluctant to ask librarians to unblock sites containing sensitive
information.2 2 2 Moreover, many of these sites may take several
days to be unblocked and the delay would place a significant burden on a patron's use of the Internet.2 23
The government appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court
of the United States heard arguments on March 5, 2003.224
D. Will CIPA Be Constitutional?
The parties, commentators, and scholars were split on whether
Congress had finally drafted a bill regulating the Internet that
would adhere to the Constitution.225 Some surmised that the Supreme Court's decision would most likely depend on whether the
Court believed the law was a permissible exercise of Congress'
spending power or a regulation chilling protected speech.2 26 Along
these lines proponents of the law were hopeful that the Court
might determine "that government funding of public libraries
does not create a forum in which it has an obligation to subsidize
the exercise of First Amendment rights."227 They argued that libraries and the Internet should be classified as nonpublic forums,
and the legality of any restrictions should be reviewed using a
reasonable basis standard.2 2 Others argued that the Court
should use a strict scrutiny analysis and find these restrictions to

219. Id. at 482.
220. Id. at 483-84.
221. Id. at 489.
222. Id. at 486.
223. Id. at 487.
224. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
225. See Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Protection Act and the CongressionalAssault on the FirstAmendment in Public Libraries,80
WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1097-99 (2002) (arguing CIPA is unconstitutional).
226. Id. at 1059.
227. Id. at 1079.
228. Id. at 1086-91.
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be a prior restraint.22 9 Finally, some thought the Court may find
the government's argument persuasive that Internet filtering is
analogous to a library's acquisition of books.2 3' Each of these arguments will be explored in more detail below.
E. Are Filtersa PermissibleExercise of Congress' Spending
Power?
When passing CIPA, Congress obviously relied on their growing trend to regulate this nation through the power of the purse.
In recent years legislation placing restrictions on recipients of
federal funds has increased.2 3 ' Some view this phenomena skeptically, asserting that this is:
one of the primary tools Congress uses to control the activities of
prospective funding recipients in ways that conform to its vision of
contemporary federal policy because this frequently avoids many of
the troublesome constitutional barriers that would make such control problematic, if not
232 impossible, if they were attempted as direct
statutory mandates.

Although the courts have given Congress much more latitude
with funding legislation that imposes restrictions than they may
have with other laws, restrictions do exist on Congress' spending
power.23 3 These limits
include using the spending power for the
"'general welfare' 23 4 of the United States and "'unambiguously' 235
describing the funding conditions that must relate "'to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs. ' '236 In addi
tion, no excessive coercion is permissible, and "'other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.' 23 7

229. Id. at 1091-97.
230. Gregory K Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of the Use of Software Filters To ControlAccess to Internet Pornography in Public Libraries,51 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 259-63 (2003).
231. See Hinckley, supra note 201, at 1060.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1061-64 (discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
234. Id. at 1062 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207).
235. Id. at 1063 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1063 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 208).
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Professor Hinckley, Associate Dean for Library and Information Technology and Professor of Law at the University of South
Carolina School of Law, thoroughly traces the Court's decisions
regarding conditional funding in the First Amendment context.238
Ultimately he concludes that the Court can take two approaches
when faced with this issue. One approach is to adopt the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to overturn the legislation when
the condition is so coercive the recipient has no choice but to
forego constitutionally protected activity. 239 The other approach is
for the Court to classify the restriction as a mere subsidy which
does not prohibit the individual from engaging in the activity on
her own time or with her own money.24 ° Hinckley notes that oftentimes the choice between the two approaches is result
driven.2 4 ' CIPA's survival will depend on which analytical scheme
the court adopts.
The ACLU, of course, argued that the Court should adopt the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and overturn the statute.2 4 2
Relying on the holding in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez243 that
prohibited Congress from imposing restrictions which distort the
traditional function of the medium, the ACLU urged the Court to
find that filters distort "'the usual functioning of public libraries

as places of freewheeling inquiry. "'2

The government countered the ACLU position by arguing government entities, such as libraries, do not have Constitutional
rights.24 5 Moreover, since the federal aid goes to the libraries and
not the patron, the appellees cannot argue that CIPA imposes an
unconstitutional condition on the patron's First Amendment
rights.24 6 Even if the library would have some unconstitutional

238. Id. at 1065-72.
239. Id. at 1070.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1070-71.
242. Brief for Appellees at 45-48, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (No. 02-361) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 534, 536, 544-45
(2001)).
243. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
244. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 48 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app.
187a, n.36, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
245. Brief for Appellants at 40, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (No. 02-361).
246. Id. at 41.
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conditions claim, the claim would lack merit because libraries
have traditionally excluded pornography from their collections
and CIPA does not prohibit the recipient of federal aid from "'engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
[assisted] program.' 2 4 7 In addition, the restrictions will not distort the usual functioning of a library because "[p]roviding patrons with illegal or harmful pornography is not 'inherent' in the
role of public libraries in our society."2 48
F. Is Internet Access at LibrariesSimilar to TraditionalPublic
Forums?
How Internet access at libraries is classified is very important
because the classification will dictate the level of scrutiny the
court uses to analyze the law.24 9 Traditional and limited public forums are analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, whereas nonpublic forums must survive a rational basis review.2 50
The appellees in American LibraryAss'n classified libraries not
21
as limited public forums, but as true traditional public forums,
because libraries allow all members of the public to enter and
"provide broad access to a wide range of speakers when they offer
Internet access."25 2 Such Internet service has a "'speechfacilitating character,"' much like a sidewalk or public park, that
253
makes it "'distinctly deserving of First Amendment protection.'
The government noted in its brief that the Supreme Court has
never "decided what level of scrutiny applies to a public library's
content-based judgments
regarding the material it makes available to its patrons." 2 4 The government argued that neither forum
analysis nor strict scrutiny applied because "the Court ha[d]
made clear that the government has broad discretion to make

247. Id. at 41 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
248. Id. at 44 (quoting Velasquez, 531 U.S. at 543).
249. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
250. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
251. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 24-27.
252. Id. at 25.
253. Id. at 24 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app. 129a, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003)).
254. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 20.
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content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make
available to the public."25" Libraries, not courts, must have broad
discretion to make content-based decisions in fulfilling their mission to facilitate worthwhile and appropriate research, learning,
and recreational reading and pursuits. 25 6 Therefore, the government contended that neither forum analysis nor strict scrutiny
applied to a public library's collection decisions, but a rational basis review should apply instead. 7
The government argued that such restrictions are reasonable,
because even if the filters erroneously block some protected
speech, this material can be found on other websites.2 58 Alternatively, the government argued that filters satisfy even the strict
scrutiny standard because the government has a compelling interest in protecting children, and the filters are the least restrictive means to accomplish this goal.259
G. Does CIPA Impose a PriorRestrainton Speech?
Prior restraints on speech are presumptively invalid.260 However, the government in American Library Ass'n argued that the
use of filters by a library is not a prior restraint because "[any
material blocked by a filter remains on the Internet and may be
obtained from millions of computers throughout the world."261 The
library classified the "decision not to provide such material
through its own computers"
as a "collection decision, not a re26 2
straint on private speech."

255. Id.
256. Id. at 22.
257. Id. at 11, 32. The appellants rely on National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 585-86 (1998), and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998), to support their argument. These cases held that broad discretion must be given to the National Endowment for the Arts and public television stations to fulfill their mission. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673.
258. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 35.
259. Id. at 39.
260. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 43-44 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
261. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 45.
262. Id.
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In contrast, plaintiffs argued that CIPA "block[s] speech that is
not even close to the line between protected and unprotected
speech" and therefore CIPA is unconstitutional.2 6 3 Filtering programs imposed by libraries function as "automated censors" that
block, with no prior judicial review, websites containing protected
speech.2 64 The ACLU would not accept the government's argument that the use of filters is not a prior restraint because it is
much like the "library's decision not to [order] Playboy." 26 The
ACLU, however, distinguished local book selection and a federal
mandate for participation in a much-needed funding program.26 6
Particularly, CIPA cuts the librarians out of the selection process
altogether and gives that discretion to third-party, nongovernmental actors.26 7
H. Is FilteringAnalogous to a Library'sAcquisition of Books?
The government's argument was essentially that the CIPA filtering requirement is really no different than a library deciding
which books to include in their collection. 26" Libraries cannot
choose to carry every book or even multiple copies of every
book. 269 As a result, a library has to make discretionary judgments about what to purchase with its finite resources.2 ° In
much the same way, the filtering programs exclude certain parts
of the Internet-i.e., pornography-which libraries may not want
to offer to their patrons.2 7 '
In response to the government's print and Internet collection
comparison, the ACLU challenged this argument on six grounds:
(1) CIPA actually takes away a library's discretion because it
mandates libraries nationwide to utilize filters even if they have
decided against such a policy; 27 2 (2) Fundamental differences exist

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 11.
See id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 11, 18, 22-23.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 39.
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between filters and book selection because book selection involves
review, unlike the blocked websites that have never been reviewed;273 (3) Filters are not like third-party vendors or book reviews because they censor, rather than select, material that will
be added to the collection; 2 4 (4) No credible reason exists that
prohibits subjecting book collection to rational basis review and
Internet access to strict scrutiny;25 (5) Filters "'would risk transforming the role of public libraries in our society;"'276 and (6) The
government's argument that the blocked sites are reasonable befrom other sites is a "twisted
cause patrons can get information 277
rewriting of the First Amendment."

I. The Supreme Court Decision
The government appealed the lower court decision, and the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments on March 5,
2003.278 On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court, in a plurality deci-

sion with three separate opinions, upheld CIPA.279 Six Justices
ruled that the filter law conditioning library subsidies on Internet
filter use did not exceed Congress's spending clause power, violate the library patron's First Amendment rights, or impose unconstitutional conditions on the libraries' receipt of federal aid.28 °
In reversing the district court's decision that the law unconstitutionally imposed a content-based restriction on access to a public
forum because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the government's compelling interest, the Court refused to utilize the public
forum principles for this case. 28 '
Determining that the public forum principles were "out of
place" for this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to find Internet access in a public library a public forum because historically

273. Id. at 39-40.
274. Id. at 40-41.
275. Id. at 41.
276. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 19).
277. Id. at 41-42.
278. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
279. Id.
280. FederalLaw Conditioning Library Subsidies on Internet Filter Use is Ruled Constitutional, 71 U.S.L.W. 1791, 1791 (June 24, 2003).
281. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2303-04.
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it was not designated as such, and its purpose was not to encourage a diversity of views like traditional public forums. 282 Rather, a
library provides Internet access only to aid its patrons with their
research and information collection. 2 3 The opinion analogized the
public libraries' discretionary judgment about what to make
available to patrons to the National Endowment for the Arts'
("NEA") content-based criteria in making funding decisions and a
public television station's editorial judgment regarding what its
viewers see.28 4 In both of those prior contexts, the Court refused
to become involved in discretionary judgments which necessarily
had to be made by the entities themselves.2 5
The Court found the libraries' argument-that they enjoy less
discretion with the Internet compared to book selection because
each book is affirmatively chosen to be acquired-of no constitutional significance. 28 6 A library's decision to exclude pornography
from its print collection was not subject to strict scrutiny, so neither should its decision to block similar material online.28 7 Furthermore, due to the ever-changing nature of the Internet, it
would be unrealistic to expect a library to review every web
page. 2 8 Likewise, the filters' "overblocking" tendencies were not
fatal because it was relatively easy for a patron to ask for the site
to be unblocked.28 9
Having dismissed the public forum analysis, the Court next rejected the libraries' argument that CIPA somehow "impose[d] an
unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance."2 9°
Refusing to answer whether the government had First Amendment rights at all, the Court held the question was irrelevant because the "unconstitutional conditions" claim failed on its merits. 291 Relying on its previous decision in Rust v. Sullivan,292 the

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 2304-05.
Id.
Id. at 2304.
Id.
Id. at 2306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2307.
Id.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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Court concluded that Congress, in passing the E-rate and LSTA
programs, was not denying a benefit to anyone but merely insisting that these "'public funds be spent for the purposes for which
they were authorized.' 29 3 Since libraries are still free to offer unfiltered access and forego the federal assistance, there is no penalty on that activity.29 4
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy failed to see any issue in
the case since an adult patron could ask for any blocked site to be
disabled. 29 5 However, he did acknowledge that there may be "an
as-applied challenge" if a library did not have the capacity to unblock the sites or the user's access is burdened in some way.29 6
Justice Breyer, although not requiring strict scrutiny, proposed
some heightened scrutiny rather than rational basis review when
examining the statute.2 97 In his opinion, the Court should ask
"whether the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate
in light of both the justifications and the potential alternatives."29 Taking CIPA through this heightened, yet not strict
scrutiny analysis, he was satisfied that the statute was constitutional because the government has a compelling interest and
there was presently no better solution or alternative. 299 Although
he acknowledged the patron may be burdened when asking for a
site to be unblocked, Justice Breyer refused to recognize that
burden as outweighing the government's interest in protecting
children from pornographic materials."'
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent focusing on the filters'
acknowledged flaws of "underblocking" and "overblocking" and
the variety of alternative, less restrictive methods available.0 1 He
293. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196). In Rust,
Congress placed limits on federal funds used for family planning purposes by prohibiting
the funds for any programs that included abortion counseling. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81.
The Supreme Court upheld the restriction, holding that the restriction did not deny a
benefit to anyone but was necessary to make sure the funds were being spent for the purposes for which they were authorized. Id. at 196.
294. Am. LibraryAss'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2308.
295. Id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 2310-11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
300. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 2312-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:721

refused to find the statute cured by the provision allowing for patrons to ask for sites to be unblocked, because a patron may have
no knowledge of those sites.30 2 He also feared that the libraries'
various procedures regarding unblocking would lead to a prior restraint on adult access to protected speech. 0 3
In addition, Justice Stevens took issue with the plurality's finding that the statute does not impose an unconstitutional condition
on public libraries. 0 4 He argued that the plurality improperly relied on Rust v. Sullivan because that case only applies to situations of government speech. 30 5 The federal assistance under the ERate and LSTA programs was designed to give Internet access to
low-income individuals, not to promote or convey any specific
government speech.30 ' Furthermore, even if there was a message
of no pornography, the filtering devices would not promote this
message because of their flaws of "underblocking" and "overblock-

ing. "307
Justice Souter, with Justice Ginsburg joining, wrote another
dissent adding that if the libraries had placed filters on the computers on their own, they would have violated the First Amendment.30 8 Specifically, the Justices were gravely concerned with the
permissive statutory language of "may," when referring to the
granting of an adult's request to unblock a site. 30 9 Even more objectionable is the discretion given the librarian who only needs to
unblock the site for "'bona fide research or other lawful purposes."'3 10 As a result, adults will be blocked from a substantial
amount of protected material.3"1 ' A library cannot do that because
blocking protected speech is censorship, not discretionary selection of materials as described by the plurality.3 2 Justices Souter
and Ginsburg felt the plurality's comparison to the discretionary

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2318 (Souter, J., dissenting).
at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)).
at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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selection of books was flawed because the reasons for the discretion-scarcity of resources and space-are not present with the
Internet.313 Moreover, since it is a longstanding policy that a library not deny any adult patron access to a book in its collection,
the plurality's characterization of the library's mission to deny
adults access to certain books was misplaced.314 Finally, Justice
Souter and Justice Ginsburg compared site blocking to removing
library materials from the shelves and were comfortable with the
courts reviewing such decisions." 5
The Supreme Court incorrectly decided this case. As Professor
Hinckley predicted, the Court justified its decision by fantasizing
that somehow blocking websites was not a penalty, since the libraries could choose to give patrons unfiltered access and forego
the funding. 6 However, this is hardly a choice at all. With budgets for all governmental entities shrinking, it is safe to assume
that these subsidies are a huge part of libraries' technology budgets. The choice for the libraries then is to install the filters and
get the subsidies, or have no Internet service at all. Being unable
to provide Internet service to aid patrons with their research and
informational pursuits, especially their lowest income patrons,
flies in the face of a library's very mission.
The plurality's position is even less defensible in light of the
uncontradicted evidence that the filters just do not work because
of the under-inclusive and over-inclusive nature of the present
technology. 7 To mandate filters is absurd and shortsighted when
there are less restrictive methods available for meeting the government's compelling and laudable goal of protecting children
from pornography. Equally discouraging is the plurality's glossing
over the chilling effect these filters will have. Justice Stevens
rightfully points out that many patrons will not request any unblocking because they will not be aware of what sites should be
unblocked. 1 Also, why should the request be limited to "bona

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2322-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2308.
See id. at 2306.
Id. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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fide research" purposes?31 9 Is there a problem with just wanting
access to the material for enjoyment purposes? Finally, the plurality's analogy with print pornographic materials being excluded
because they are deemed inappropriate is weak.32 ° Without looking at each website, how will a librarian know if it contains material that is truly inappropriate, and therefore, would not be included in the library's collection if it were in print?
Unfortunately, a librarian will not know-thus the only result
will be that protected speech will be censored from adults unnecessarily, and speech that is harmful to neither adults nor minors
will be blocked.3 21 Justice Stevens summed this up best when he
stated, "[iun my judgment, a statutory blunderbuss that mandates
this vast amount of 'overblocking' abridges
the freedom of speech
3 22
Amendment."
First
the
by
protected
Any critics of the opinion who would like to see it overturned
may not have long to wait, because Justice Kennedy's opinion
foreshadowed the next constitutional challenge to the statute.32 3
Although agreeing that on its face CIPA was valid, he left open
an "as-applied" challenge if libraries do not have the capacity to
disable the filters readily or if the adult patron's viewing of constitutionally protected material is burdened in some other way.324
This appears likely, since the statute does not make unblocking
mandatory and leaves a great deal of discretion to the librarian
whether to unblock the site or not. 325 Both Justices Kennedy and
Breyer upheld the statute based on an adult patron's right to
have the site unblocked.3 26 If it becomes evident that this is not
occurring in practice, the Court, counting Justices Kennedy and
Breyer as the swing votes, may revisit the statute, declaring it
unconstitutional.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the government's arguments and
the Supreme Court's decision is that they are both largely premised on the library's discretionary judgment to decide what to in319. Id. at 2302 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)).
320. Id. at 2306.
321. See id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 2309-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
325. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(D) (2000).
326. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2309-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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clude in its collection. Specifically, since a library's decision not to
include pornography in its collection is not subject to strict scrutiny neither should its decision to block similar material online.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the use of a filtering system
is a collection decision not a prior restraint on speech. 27 Yet it is
not the libraries' decision to block the online material. In fact, the
libraries vehemently oppose filters, and on July 25, 2003, the
American Library Association issued a press release that reiterated its commitment to continue to educate the public about the
negative impacts of CIPA and to continue to seek and protect the
First Amendment rights of library users.3 28 If libraries in a specific community decide filters are the best way to address the
pornography problem, then the Court's analysis may be correct.
However, this has not yet been the situation. Congress is the body
blocking the online material (making the collection decision), not
the libraries, so the analogy that the Court uses is misplaced.
IV. ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY: THE CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT (CPPA) AND THE PROTECT ACT

Addressing a separate but related problem, Congress passed
the CPPA in 1996 to prohibit "virtual" child pornography.3 29 Advances in technology have made it possible for individuals to produce computer-generated images of children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Often these images are impossible to distinguish
from real children. Supporters of the law argued it was necessary
to prevent the abuse of children. Although once again the drafters
had a commendable objective, the law's vagueness and overbreadth resulted in it being overturned by the Supreme Court.33 °
In April 2003, Congress tried again with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today

327. Id. at 2307 n.4.
328. Press Release, Am. Library Ass'n, CIPA Decision Response: A Statement from
ALA President Carla D. Hayden and the ALA Executive Board (July 25, 2003) available at
http://www.ala.org/PrinterTemplate.cfin?%20=News&template--/ContentManagementlCon
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=39847 (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
330. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).
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which is sure to be immediately

A. The Child PornographyPrevention Act ("CPPA")
Congress has also tried to regulate "virtual" child pornography
with the same outcome to date as with all other Internet laws.332
In 1996, Congress passed the CPPA-banning the knowing reproduction, distribution, sale, reception, or possession of any visual depiction of what "appears to be... a minor" or "conveys the
impression... of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."3 33 The definition of visual depiction included images generated by computers or the use of youthful looking adults. 4 Under
the statute, a first time offender may be imprisoned for up to fifteen years and repeat sexual offenders face a minimum of five
years in prison.
When the CPPA was constitutionally challenged, the district
court granted summary judgment to the government, disallowing
plaintiffs' claims that these restrictions would deter them from
producing works protected by the First Amendment.3 3 6 On review,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding portions of the CPPA to be
overbroad because the law unconstitutionally banned images that
were not obscene or were not made using real children. 33 7 Four
other circuits have upheld the law. 33' The Supreme Court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit, ruling that certain provisions of the CPPA
were overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.3 39 Spe-

331. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. § 1) [hereinafter PROTECT Act].
332. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234 (finding the CPPA overbroad and unconstitutional).
333. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
334. Id. § 2256(8).
335. Id. § 2252A(b)(1).
336. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997), affd, rev'd, remanded by 198 F. 3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
337. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 533
U.S. 234 (2002).
338. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 1999).
339. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
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cifically, the Court ruled that the government could not rely on
previous cases, which ban child pornography regardless of
whether the images were obscene. Those previous cases required
images using actual minors, which would not occur with computer-generated images or the use of young-looking adults.3 4 °
Therefore, the pornographic images could only be banned if found
to be obscene3 4 ' because such material is not protected by the
First Amendment. Since the CPPA, as written, would prohibit
342
speech that was not obscene, it violated the Miller standard.
The Court rejected the government's arguments that this broad
sweep was necessary because virtual child pornography is used to
seduce children or whet pedophiles' sexual appetites.34 3 Moreover,
the Court did not find persuasive the argument that it is too difficult for the government to distinguish between computer imaging
and actual child photos.3 44
In analyzing the statute under the Miller standard, Justice
Kennedy noted that the CPPA suppresses speech that may not
appeal to the prurient interest, is not patently offensive in light of
community standards, and has serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.34 5 In support of his position he argued that the
CPPA prohibits "[a]ny depiction of sexually explicit activity, no
matter how it is presented ....
,,346 Therefore, the statute would
apply to a picture in a psychology manual as well as books, pic3 4v
tures, and movies that have teenage sexual activity as a theme.
The Supreme Court was not willing to label Romeo and Juliet,
American Beauty, and other movies and novels as obscene.348 In
addition, the opinion distinguished New York v. Ferber,349 because
that case involved actual child participants and the state had a
compelling interest in protecting the victims of child pornogra-

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 256.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 249.
See id. at 246.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 247-48.
458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
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phy.350 However, no definitive causal link existed between virtual
child pornography and child abuse. 5 t
None of the government's arguments- including the argument
that pedophiles may use these images to seduce children or whet
their sexual appetites-were compelling to the Court. 35 2 The
Court reminded the government that speech cannot be prohibited
just because it may be misused, may encourage unlawful acts, or
may fall into the hands of children. 5 3 Likewise, the restrictions
were not justified because of the government's difficulty in identifying which images were actually computer-generated. 3 "4 This rationale would turn "the First Amendment upside down." 355 Justice
Kennedy wrote that "[tihe Government may not suppress lawful
speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected
speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles
the latter."356 In addition, the affirmative defense did not save the
statute, because the defense was incomplete and insufficient.3 57
The Court also held the CPPA section 2256(8)(D), containing
the "conveys the impression" language, unconstitutional.3 " This
provision was even more objectionable to the Court because it
turned on how the speech is presented and not on the context.3 5 9
For example, a film that contains no sexually explicit scenes may
violate this section if the trailer "conveys the impression" that it
contains pornographic material involving minors. 6 ° Particularly
disturbing to the Court was that a possessor of such a film may
be convicted even if the movie was mislabeled.3 6' The Court held
that the First Amendment required a more "precise restric-

tion. "362
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Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-50.
Id. at 249.
See id. at 251, 253.
See id. at 250-52.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257; see 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000) (repealed 2001).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, allowed the ban on computer-generated images although she
agreed with the majority opinion that (1) the CPPA's ban on
youthful adult pornography was overbroad and violated the First
Amendment; and (2) the pandering provision (18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(D)) with its "conveys the impression" language should be
struck down because it was overbroad and not narrowly tailored.36 3 In finding, however, that the "virtual" child pornography
prohibition passed strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally
vague or overly broad, Justice O'Connor utilized a narrowing interpretation to make the "appears to be ... of a minor" language
mean "virtually indistinguishable from."364 This interpretation
would allow the language to be narrowly tailored enough to meet
the government's interests without violating the First Amendment. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued that the plaintiffs
failed to show any computer-generated examples that have serious value or do not facilitate child abuse.3 65 Hence she would uphold the statute's ban on computer-generated pornographic depictions that "appear to be" of minors because there had not been a
showing that regulations
forbid "a substantial amount of valuable
3 66
or harmless speech."
In explaining why she upheld the ban on computer images as
long as it is not applied to youthful adult pornography, Justice
O'Connor expressed her view that striking a statute down due to
overbreath should be done sparingly.36 7 As a result, she was only
willing to strike the CPPA down in relation to the youthful adult
pornography. Holding that this was consistent with Congress'
understanding of what material was most dangerous to children,
she noted that, at various other places in the statute, Congress
had only addressed material made with real or virtual minors
and not material involving younger-adult pornography. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also dissented but,
unlike Justice O'Connor, would uphold the statute in its entirety.
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Id. at 260-62.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.
Id.
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The Justices asserted that the CPPA can be read narrowly and
that Congress' only goal was to extend "the definition of child
pornography to reach computer-generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct."369 They agreed that this reading, supported by the
CPPA's legislative history, would not violate the First Amendment.370
B. The Child Obscenity and PornographyPreventionAct of 2002
("COPPA")
In response to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,371 the House

proposed the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of
2002 ("COPPA").372 This new law attempted to correct the deficiencies of the CPPA by limiting depictions to computergenerated images-not youthful looking adults-and replacing
the "appears to be" language with "a computer image or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable ...from,

that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ....
COPPA would also create new provisions prohibiting producing,
trafficking, and possessing a "depiction that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a pre-pubescent child engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.

. . . ",3"

The penalties for violation of the statute

were also increased." 5 The bill also deletes the overbroad "promotion" language and replaces it with a new section titled
"[plandering and solicitation." 376 The House passed COPPA on

June 25, 2002.

77

Despite Congress' efforts to correct the CPPA's flaws, many
thought COPPA would also be ruled unconstitutional. In a letter

369. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not join in the portion of
the opinion discussing the legislative history. Id. at 271 n.2.
371. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
372. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
bss/dl07query.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
373. Id. § 3(a).
374. Id. § 5.
375. Id. § 8.
376. Id. § 4.
377. Id. § 11.
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to Representatives Lamar Smith (R-Tex-21) and Robert C. Scott
(D-Va-3), the ACLU outlined its objections to the bill section by
section.3 78 Basically, the authors argued that COPPA is unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it attempts to outlaw
"'virtual child pornography,' where no real child was used in the
production of the material," "attempts to create a category of obscenity per se," "creates an affirmative defense often impossible to
meet," and "invades the privacy of child victims." 37 9 The ACLU
asserted that this bill would repeat the mistakes already ruled
upon in Free Speech Coalition and also would make new ones.38 °
Specifically, the ACLU objected to the "virtually indistinguishable" language and modeled their argument on Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. 38 ' The ACLU noted that a majority of the Court did not agree with Justice O'Connor for the sound
reason that this form of speech can only be prohibited if it is obscene or involves an actual child. 8 2 The ACLU's position is that
computer-generated images do not involve a child and therefore
must be taken through the three-part test in Miller.13 The
CPPA's problem of criminalizing speech that was neither obscene
nor involved a minor is repeated in COPPA and could draw into
its net prohibited images that are possessed for legitimate rea384
sons.
Similarly, the pandering section has also not been adequately
corrected.3 8 5 Again, it is a crime to "'describe' an image containing a "'visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.' 38 6 Regardless of whether the actual material is not pornographic, a person could go to jail for describing it that way.3 87

378. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, and Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to Lamar Smith, Rep., U.S. Congress, and Robert C. Scott, Rep., U.S.
Congress (May 8, 2002) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], at http://www.aclu.orgnews/News
Print.cfw?Ig=10364fc=252 (last visted Mar. 30, 2004).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. (applying the test from New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
383. Id.; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
384. ACLU Letter, supra note 354.
385. See id.
386. Id. (quoting H.R. 4623 § 3).
387. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:721

The Supreme Court found this unconstitutional before and would
likely do so again.3"'
The same is true of the affirmative defense section allowing a
person to avoid penalties if they can prove that a real child was
not involved in the production of the material. 3 9 Like its predecessor, this bill makes it nearly impossible for anyone charged
with distribution or possession to use the defense because they
would likely not have access to that information.3 9 °
The ACLU attacked brand new sections of COPPA, as well as
these revised sections. For example, the section involving the obscene depictions of a prepubescent child, in their view, creates a
category of obscenity per se which they argued is unconstitutional. 391 As with the computer-generated images, the ACLU argued these depictions must be taken through the Miller test to
determine if they are in fact obscene. 39 2 The ACLU also took issue
with a new extraterritoriality provision, which would allow the
United States jurisdiction where visual depictions of child pornography are made available in the United States, even if the
foreign citizen or business had acted legally in their own countries.3 93 Finally, the ACLU challenged other sections that they argued violate the privacy rights of Internet users and the privacy
394
of child victims.
C. The ProsecutorialRemedies and Other Tools To End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECTAct)
Although COPPA died in the Senate Judiciary committee, the
Senate passed its own version of a similar bill, known as the
PROTECT Act, in the 108th Congress.39 5 The ACLU characterized this bill as "a dramatic improvement" over COPPA but still

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973)).
Id.
Id.
S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
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unconstitutional.3 9 6 According to the ACLU, the bill was unacceptable because it: (1) "[Ilmposes criminal liability on people who
possess or produce material protected by the First Amendment;"
(2) "[C]hills protected speech because it places the burden on the
defendant to prove the material was produced using an adult or
was 'virtually' created;" (3) Includes a "pandering" provision
which sweeps in non-commercial speech and includes the ambiguous term "purported material"; (4) Restricts the defendant
from providing a defense, in that it frees the government from the
"burden" of producing the actual minor allegedly involved in the
material, and thus "violates the right to confront one's accusers";
and (5) Contains an extraterritorial jurisdiction provision that
may be used by other countries to restrict speech in the United
States.397
One major difference between the House bill and the Senate
bill is that the Senate bill includes the requirement that the depiction of what appears to be a minor must also be obscene.398 But
in defining obscene child pornography, it only relies upon two of
the three prongs in Miller-the "patently offensive" prong and the
"literary, artistic, political, or scientific" prong. 9 The ACLU suggests the "prurient interest" prong must be added to cure this de40 0
fect.
The same problems exist with the affirmative defense section
as did with the CPPA's defenses and the ones in COPPA. This
problem is made even worse by the Senate version, because the
proposed bill imposes criminal liability on those who created material before the effective date of the statute. 0 1 As a result, producers who did not keep records would be unable to use the defense, much like distributors and possessors who would have
virtually no access to that information. 40 2 Although the new pan-

396. See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union, to Patrick J. Leahy, Senator, U.S.
Senate (Feb. 5, 2003), at http'/www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?lD=11806&C=252 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter ACLU Letter to Senate].
397. Id.
398. S. 151 § 6.
399. ACLU Letter to Senate, supra note 372.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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dering provision is much narrower than in the CPPA, it still
sweeps in non-commercial speech and thus is unconstitutional." 3
The ACLU objects to the provisions limiting the evidence a defendant may utilize, including the prohibition of the defense from
cross-examining the minor." 4 Finally, the ACLU fears that, like
the House bill, this bill's extraterritorial jurisdiction provision
will result in other countries imposing liability on United States
companies for their speech, even though the speech is protected
under the First Amendment. 0 5
The Congressional findings accompanying the PROTECT Act
articulate the need for such a broad bill.4 6 The Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition40 7 decision significantly impacted the government's ability to prosecute child pornographers." 8 In the Ninth
Circuit alone, the number of prosecutions dramatically decreased
and the only surviving cases were those in which the government
could "specifically identify the child in the depiction." 40 9 Because
this is nearly an insurmountable burden on the government due
to technological advances, Congress feared many defendants who
possessed images of real children would escape prosecution, and
therefore drafted the proposed legislation.4 10
The House passed the PROTECT Act, but not before melding it
with House Bill 1104, an omnibus child crimes bill.4 1' On April 3,
2003, the Senate questioned the House Amendments to their bill
and agreed to a conference.4 12 In a race to finish before a twoweek break, Congress passed the PROTECT Act on April 10,
2003.413 The media coverage of the bill barely mentioned the revised sections regulating child pornography, if at all, but instead
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See S. 151 § 2, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
407. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

408. See S. 151 § 2.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
412. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-66 (2003). The conference report was released to the
House of Representatives on April 19, 2003.
413. See 149 CONG. REC. S5,156 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (recording Senate passage of
the bill); PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
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focused on the Amber Alert network and changes to sentencing
guidelines. 14
Unfortunately, the part of the PROTECT Act dealing with child
pornography is likely to be overturned again. Only Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor voted to uphold the
provision in the CPPA that criminalized computer-generated images. 15 Two more votes would be necessary to uphold the newest
attempt by Congress to ban virtual pornography. Because virtual
child pornography involves no actual children it must be obscene
to be prohibited. Unless all three prongs of the Miller obscenity
test are woven in the statute, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer are unlikely to change their votes. The absence of the prurient interest prong makes it dead upon arrival at
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the problems with the affirmative defenses and the pandering provisions outlined above give
those five Justices even more reason to reject the law.
V. NON-LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
If, as suspected, the newest law banning virtual child pornography gets rejected by the Supreme Court, what else can this nation do to keep children safe from pornography on the Internet?
In November 1998, Congress ordered the National Research
Council ("NRC") to conduct a study to address just that. 16 In response, the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
("CSTB") of the National Academies asked the NRC's Board on
Children, Youth, and Families ("BOCYF") to form a committee
with "expertise diverse enough to address this topic."4 17 The committee published a comprehensive report that placed the issue of
child pornography in context and gave a wide range of alternatives for the nation to consider in dealing with this problem. 1 In
the report, the committee evaluated several approaches to pro-

414. See Carl Hulse, Bill To CreateAlert System on Abduction Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2003, at A22.
415. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 273 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
416. NRC Report, supra note 4, at viii.
417. Id.
418. See id. at 11-13.
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tecting children including the use of public policy, social and educational strategies, and technology-based tools.419 The committee
ultimately concluded that no solitary approach would fully address the problem and that all of the proposed strategies must
mutually reinforce each other to keep children safe. ° Part four of
this article discusses each of these approaches in greater detail.
A. Public Policy
As discussed previously, the regulatory approach has not been
very successful due to various constitutional restrictions. 1 Congress should continue to try to craft laws that will withstand the
strict scrutiny test. Congress has been given very specific guidance from the courts on trying to draft such laws. First, if the image does not involve the use of an actual child, the material must
meet all three prongs of the Miller obscenity test.42 2 Second, all
defendants must be able to avail themselves of any affirmative
defense in COPA. 423 Third, the government must make a credible
case that the solution is the least restrictive means to accomplish
the objective. 4 Fourth, any regulation must be narrowly tailored
to this objective. Congress needs to be particularly mindful that
any phrases and terms used must be specific and limited so as not
to be too broad or unconstitutionally vague.42 5
If such a hypothetical law could ever be constitutionally
drafted, the regulations may ultimately prove ineffective in
shielding our children from harmful Internet content if the international community does not adopt similar laws.4 26 While Internet child protection laws will have an impact on both the suppli-
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See id. at 8-11.
See id. at 12.
See supra discussion Parts I-III.
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ers and potential consumers of material harmful to minors; this
impact will primarily be in the United States and not abroad.4 27
However, the NRC report indicated that public policy does not
need to be limited to laws that are penal in nature.4 2 Public policy could also be used "to reduce uncertainty in the regulatory environment; promote media literacy and Internet safety education... ; support development of and access to high-quality
Internet material that is educational and attractive to children in
an age-appropriate manner; and support self-regulatory efforts by
private parties."4 2 9
B. Social and EducationalStrategies
As the case law makes clear, the Internet's very nature makes
it nearly impossible to regulate. The Internet has no boundaries.
No matter what sites the United States prohibits, Internet users
will still be able to access foreign sites. This lack of boundaries
also makes it very difficult to use any type of community standards test. Communities will differ on what material they find
harmful to minors and these discrepancies will prohibit any software program from adequately filtering or blocking potentially
harmful material.4 30 Yet valid, sexually oriented expression must
not be "silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from
it." 43 ' Therefore, teachers, parents, and communities are ultimately responsible for their children's education and safety while
using the Internet. Because of this, the NRC report noted that
"[tihe most important social and educational strategy is responsi4 32
ble adult involvement and supervision."
1. Parental Supervision
Parents must educate their children about what is and is not
appropriate. But even the best parents will not be able to monitor
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

Id. at 359.
See id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 235, 251 (2002).
NRC Report, supra note 4, at 9.
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their children-especially teenagers-all the time. Parents must
provide their children with the tools to make responsible and safe
choices while using the Internet, including knowing how to access
valuable and appropriate materials on the Internet and also
knowing what to do if they accidentally come across inappropriate
materials or activities. Although technology may help parents in
their endeavor to keep pornography from their children, its imperfections make it impossible to be the only tool used in this battle. In fact, one of the best tools, as recognized by the NRC committee, is for parents to become familiar with the Internet
themselves.43 3 In addition, peers and siblings can help parents
educate younger children.4 34
2. Acceptable Use Policies
Another suggestion of the NRC committee is to encourage families, schools, and libraries to adopt and enforce an "Acceptable
Use Policy" ("AUP"). 435 An AUP is "a written agreement, signed
by students, their parents, and their teachers, outlining the terms
and conditions of Internet use for the safety and educational
benefit of the students."4 3 6 These agreements not only deal with
the issues of pornography and obscenity, but also such matters as
copyright and intellectual property laws, defamation, and commercial use of the school provided Internet access.
When designing AUPs, the school or library should remember
that the AUP is a legal document and should be reviewed by an
attorney. 43 A good AUP should contain: (1) An overview of what
the Internet is, how it will be used in the institution, and why access to it is beneficial to the educational process; 438 (2) Usage policies and guidelines, including what constitutes acceptable and
unacceptable uses of the Internet; 419 (3) Penalties for violating the

433. See id. at 9.
434. See id. at 8.
435. See id.
436. Internet 101: The Internet Guide for Teachers & Parents:Acceptable Use Policies
(AUP's),at http://www.horizon.nmsu.edu/101/html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
437. See id.
438. See id.
439. See id.
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policies and guidelines of the AUP;" ° (4) A description of the
rights of individuals using the networks in the school or district;4 41 (5) A disclaimer absolving the institution, under specific
circumstances, from responsibility;44 2 and (6) Language clearly
indicating Internet access is a privilege, not a right, and may be
withdrawn." 3
There are many web resources that can aid an institution in
drafting an AUP."4 Taking advantage of the various templates
and suggestions listed on the web is most helpful; however, they
should not be adopted without sufficiently tailoring them to the
needs and philosophies of each individual institution.
Although designing an AUP would appear to be fairly easy and
straightforward, there are many issues institutions should consider before attempting to draft one. If these concerns are ignored, the AUP may be challenged in court-much like the federal statutes discussed previously." 5 Perhaps the biggest
challenge could be based upon AUP's vagueness. In other words,
does the AUP clearly illustrate to students the difference between
what is considered appropriate and inappropriate behavior and
how such inappropriate behavior could possibly lead to discipline?
If a court determines it does not, the AUP could be ruled unconstitutional.
Many common phrases found in AUPs regarding inappropriate
actions may in fact be vague and subject to court challenges. For
example, phrases such as "[situdents shall not access any objectionable material or inappropriate material"" 6 or "[s]tudents shall
not post defamatory, inaccurate, abusive, obscene, profane, sexu-
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ally-oriented, threatening, offensive, or illegal material"4 47 do not
clearly indicate to a student what they can and cannot access or
post.44 Not only are the phrases vague, but they are also probably
too broad, sweeping some protected speech within their coverage.
Such vague speech likely has First Amendment ramifications because a court could find it chills students' free speech. Students
must fully understand what they can and cannot do." 9
Despite these problems, AUPs may go a long way in helping
provide a framework for children to start making good choices
about their Internet use.
3. Internet Safety Education
Just as we teach children about safety with strangers, as communities we should be teaching them about Internet safety. Information and media literacy will help in that regard. 5 ° Children
who are trained with these skills will be less likely to access inappropriate material and will be better prepared to handle the
situation when they do.451
The NRC committee recommended that Internet education
should not be limited to children but through public service announcements and media campaigns should also educate adults
about the nature and extent of the dangers of the Internet. 2
Adults should urge the development of more websites that are
"compelling, safe, and educational."45 3 Greater availability of
these preferred sites will make it less desirable for children to
seek out inappropriate sites. 4 In addition, schools and libraries
should compile lists of these preferred sites to make available to
parents and children. 5 5

447. See id.
448. Nancy Willard, A Legal EducationalAnalysis of K-12 Internet Acceptable Use Policies 8 (1997). A copy of this article is on file with the author.
449. Id. at 9.
450. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 9.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. Id. at 9.
454. See id.
455. See id. at 250.
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C. Technology-Based Tools
Although this article outlined the deficiencies of current technological tools, this is not to say that filters and other technological tools have no use. In the home setting, filters can be the first
line of defense for parents. Parents must be aware, however, that
filters will not only block inappropriate material but also a large
volume of legitimate material. 56 In addition, some inappropriate
material will escape the filter, so parents must not rely exclusively on technology to protect their children.4 57 Parents may also
want to monitor the websites their children visit, but they should
be aware that this may have an effect "on the basic trust that is a
foundation of a healthy parent-child relationship."4 5 8 Explaining
this practice to the child before monitoring may help maintain
that trust.
Besides filters and monitoring, the NRC report lists several
other tools including content-limited access, labeling of content,
and spam-controlling tools.4 59 Similar to the filters, these tools all
have disadvantages associated with them. Again, that is not to
say they have no use, but just that parents must weigh the benefits and the detriments before utilizing these tools.
VI. CONCLUSION

In this unsettled area of law, the goal of keeping children protected from indecent and sexually explicit material on the Internet is shared by virtually all those concerned. How to achieve the
universal goal is subject to intense debate. Legislation to this
point has failed based on "vagueness" and "overbreadth" challenges. Federal courts have agreed that the laws violated the
First Amendment since they chilled protected speech.
Perhaps the only way to protect children is to take a multifaceted approach, including public policy, social and educational
strategies, and the use of technological tools. Each of these approaches has associated benefits and costs. Of all the strategies
available, supervision by parents, teachers, and librarians is most
456.
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important to ensure that children are not viewing improper material on the Internet. Such supervision can become somewhat of
a burden on a teacher or librarian who deals with many children
daily, or a parent who is balancing work and demands at home.
Therefore, it is crucial that we educate our children so that they
can ultimately make their own responsible and safe decisions
when using the Internet. Until the day arrives that technology
advances to cure the defects that currently exist in the filtering
software programs, this debate over how to best protect our children without violating the First Amendment will continue.

